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We analyse the characteristics of lockup agreements of IPOs on the Neuer Markt and the Nouveau Marché from 
1996 to 2000. Even though both markets were part of the same EuroNM network, the characteristics of their 
lockup agreements are substantially different. Firm characteristics have a major influence on lockup contracts. 
In addition, shareholder characteristics explain the diversity of contracts within the same firm. Although the 
French regulator offers two types of minimum lockup contracts, the market perceives a difference between the 
two contracts as the choice is influenced by the type of the firm and the type of shareholders.  
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Markt, Nouveau Marché, EuroNM, asymmetric information 
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1. Introduction 
Lockup contracts
1 are agreements that prevent the initial shareholders of IPO firms from selling a specific 
percentage  of  their  shares  over  a  certain  period  following  the  admission  of  their  firm  to  the  stock 
exchange. One of the interesting features of lockup contracts is that they tend to be mostly voluntary 
arrangements.  For  example,  although  the  UK  and  US
2  stock  markets  do  not  impose  any  generally 
applicable minimum lockups, most firms that go public have such arrangements in place. Even for the 
case  of  the  markets  that  require  minimum  lockups,  such  as  the  Euro  New  Markets  (EuroNM)  of 
Continental  Europe,  the  original  shareholders  often  tend  to  agree  to  lockup  periods  and  locked  in 
shareholdings which far exceed the legal minimum. 
Another interesting feature is the diversity of lockup contracts across and within countries in terms of their 
contractual characteristics. The US is at one extreme of the spectrum with very short lockup periods. Over 
the last decade, there has been an increasing trend in the US towards standardisation in terms of the 
lockup  duration  (see  Bradley  et  al.,  2001).  Whereas  the  (voluntary)  US  lockup  contracts  are  mostly 
standardised, the lockup contracts on the continental European markets are frequently mandatory and the 
lockup periods are more varied and longer. At the other end of the spectrum are the lockup contracts of 
UK firms with an average duration of about 600 days and with even greater diversity in terms of expiry 
dates. There is not only diversity in terms of the lockup expiry, but also in terms of the specification of the 
expiry date itself. Whereas the lockup contracts of continental European and US IPOs tend to specify 
clear-cut dates, i.e. absolute dates such as 31 July 2002, about a quarter of lockup arrangements of UK 
IPOs specify a date which is relative to a corporate event, e.g. the publication of the annual report for the 
forthcoming year (Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed, 2001).  
The third interesting feature of lockup agreements is that the US studies have found evidence of a negative 
share price reaction on the day of their expiry (e.g. Bradley et al., 2003; Brav and Gompers, 2003). This 
evidence contradicts the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), as the IPO prospectus contains all the details 
of the lockup agreement (including the expiry date). Consequently, there should be no significant price 
change at expiry. To the opposite of studies on US data, Espenlaub et al. (2001) do not find significant 
abnormal returns around the expiry for a sample of UK IPOs.  
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, there is only a small body of research 
on lockup agreements and all the published studies are on the US stock markets, apart from Espenlaub et 
al. (2001, 2003b) on the UK. In this paper, we extend the literature to the two major markets which were 
part of the EuroNM alliance of continental European stock markets, i.e. the German Neuer Markt and the 
French Nouveau Marché. In the second half of the 1990s, these stock exchanges attracted many high 
technology  firms.  Lockup  agreements  may  be  one  way  to  reduce  agency  problems  and  asymmetric 
information  on  firm  quality  which  may  be  particularly  prominent  in  these  firms.  Second,  the  paper 
benefits from a high-quality database which comprises data on all the lockup agreements applying to the 
                                                            
1  A  lockup  agreement  is  called  engagement  de  conservation  in  French  and  Veräußerungsverbot  or 
Marktschutzvereinbarung in German. 
2 Certain shareholders of US issuing firms may still be subject to restrictions concerning the sale of their shares (see 
table 1). However, Field and Hanka (2001) find that 91% of the shares owned by the initial shareholders are locked 
in after the IPO via lockup contracts and another 4% are prohibited from selling by SEC Rule 144. Lockup agreements  3 
individual shareholders of each firm.
3 Our data are more detailed than those analysed by previous studies. 
Not only do we have data on directors’ holdings, but also on the holdings of all other shareholders. For 
each firm we are also able to distinguish the founding shareholders from other pre-IPO shareholders. Our 
results show that, in addition to firm characteristics, the identity of the shareholder (venture-capitalist or 
other shareholder), her position on the board (executive or non-executive director), and the importance of 
her stake compared to the stakes owned by other shareholders are major determinants of the lockup length 
and period. Third, we contribute to the agency literature by investigating whether lockup agreements are 
substitute  instruments  to  initial  underpricing,  venture  capital-backing  of  the  firm,  and  control 
concentration.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. For both countries, shareholders of firms with more 
uncertainty (smaller and younger firms with more intangibles) are locked in for longer periods. Venture 
capitalists have shorter lockup agreements which suggests that they prefer to exit the firm at the earliest 
(legal) opportunity. In contrast, executive and non-executive directors who retain equity stakes after the 
flotation are locked in for longer periods. We also examine whether the presence of a venture capitalist 
has a negative impact on lockup duration given the possible certification role of VCs, but find no evidence 
of such a role. In French IPOs, strong ownership concentration is related to longer lockup agreements, but 
not  when  control  is  held  by  a  single  shareholder.  This  suggests  that  the  presence  of  multiple  large 
shareholders leads to longer lockups but that one powerful shareholder can reduce the duration of her 
lockup contract. For the German IPOs (though not for the French ones), the lockup length is a substitute to 
initial underpricing in terms of a signal of firm quality.  
In contrast to the German regulation, the French regulation provides firms with a choice between locking 
in 100% of the shares for 6 months and locking in only 80% of the shares but for 1 year. Interestingly, we 
find that for France, the market is not indifferent between the two legal ‘minimum’ lockup agreements. 
Overall, the former is perceived to be less stringent than the latter, as it is chosen by firms with less 
uncertainty about their value. Furthermore, we find that when there is little ownership dispersion and 
ownership is highly concentrated (as measured by the Herfindahl index) the former contract is chosen. 
When ownership dispersion is low but less concentrated, the lockup duration tends to be longer. In this 
case (when the multiple shareholders have individually less control power), either the alternative legal 
minimum of a one-year lockup for 80% of the shares is chosen or a contract which covers 100% of the 
shares  and  lasts  longer  than  the  legal  minimum  of  6  months.  When  a  firm  is  VC-backed,  all  the 
shareholders tend to be locked in and exemptions are rare. However, the probability that lockup contracts 
which are stricter than the legal minima will be imposed on the venture capitalists themselves or on the 
founders is small. Finally, we do not find any evidence that firms, that signal their superior quality by 
locking in their shareholders for longer or with a higher proportion of their shares, are able to revise their 
offer price upwards during the offer period.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the regulation concerning lockup 
contracts  on  the  two  markets  and  compares  it  with  that  on  other  markets.  Section  3  discusses  the 
theoretical reasons for the existence of voluntary and compulsory lockup agreements and develops the 
                                                            
3  The  only  other  studies on French and German lockup contracts are of, Ducros (2001) and Nowak and Gropp 
(2000), both unpublished, which use data aggregated at the firm level. Neither study clearly states how firms with 
more than one lockup agreement are treated. As we will see later, the vast majority of firms have more than one 
contract in place specifying a different expiry date and/or percentage of shares locked in. Lockup agreements  4 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 gives information on data and reviews the contractual characteristics of 
the lockup contracts on the French and German new markets. In section 5, we discuss the results from the 
regressions and multinomial logit models explaining the period of the lockup and the percentage of shares 
locked in. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Regulatory provisions and their enforceability 
As table 1 shows, the French and German EuroNM markets as well as the other partners of the EuroNM 
alliance,  the  Brussels  EuroNM,  the  Dutch  Nieuwe  Markt  and  the  Italian  Nuovo  Mercato,  all  impose 
minimum lockup periods. For France, up to 1 December 1998, all directors and founders were locked in 
with 80% of their shares for 3 years. From this date onwards, directors and founders had to be locked in 
with all of their shares for 6 months or with 80% of their shares for a year. For Germany, all the initial 
shareholders are locked in for 6 months with 100% of their shares. Hence, French firms have a choice 
both in terms of the lockup period and the percentage of shares locked in whereas German firms can only 
choose the length of the lockup period. 
Although, US regulation imposes compulsory lockup periods only in certain limited cases (see table 1), 
most firms have voluntary lockup contracts in place. The UK is similar in the sense that, prior to January 
2000, lockup contracts were only mandatory for firms with a trading history of less than 3 years. Since 
January 2000, there have been no compulsory lockups. However, certain types of firms are required to 
display in their IPO prospectus a prominent statement whether they have a lockup agreement, and if not 
the reasons for its absence.
4 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
There is one additional important difference between the French and German markets. In Germany, the 
lockup rule of 6 months also applies to the company itself. As a result the firm is not allowed to issue any 
new shares during the six-month regulatory lockup period. The lockup agreement in the IPO prospectus of 
Euromed AG Health Systems (p.12) illustrates this difference: 
Future disposals by the existing shareholders 
Once the placement of the shares is complete (including the exercising of the Greenshoe 
option), the existing shareholders will hold 50% of the Company’s share capital. They 
have pledged not to offer for sale or dispose of any shares directly or indirectly within a 
period of six months from the start of trading in the Neuer Markt. Taking account of the 
relevant provisions of national stock corporation law, the Company has pledged, for a 
period of six months from the admission of the shares to the Regulated Market and to 
trading in the Neuer Markt of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, not to offer for sale directly 
or indirectly, or dispose of any shares, nor to announce this or undertake any measures 
which would be equivalent in economic terms to an issue or a disposal (see also section 
“Risk factors – Concentration of share ownership”). 
                                                            
4 See table 19.2 of Goergen et al. (2004) for a synopsis of the listing requirements of the UK stock exchanges.  Lockup agreements  5 
3.  Reasons for the existence of lockup agreements 
At  the  time  of  the  flotation,  outsiders  usually  have  little  information  about  a  firm.  In  contrast,  the 
incumbent shareholders, who are frequently involved in the management of the firm, tend to have a better 
picture about the firm’s prospects. Consequently, one of the reasons for lockup agreements is to protect 
outside investors from being exploited by insiders acting on private information (Brav and Gompers, 
2003). Committing the incumbents to keep their holdings over a certain time after the IPO makes it more 
likely that any private information becomes public. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1:  
Firms  characterised  by more  uncertainty  about their value will have longer lockups and/or lockups 
involving a higher percentage of the shares for all the shareholders. 
The incumbent shareholders in turn may opt for an agreement with a longer duration than that prescribed 
by the regulator to signal their superior quality to outsiders. This argument is in line with the Leland and 
Pyle (1977) model in which the founder signals his firm’s higher value by retaining a large stake after the 
IPO. The lockup agreement is then a legal device enabling the incumbent shareholders to precommit to 
retaining a high stake over a certain period after the flotation. In other words, the lockup agreement acts as 
a complement to the percentage of shares retained by the initial shareholders immediately after the IPO. 
Alternatively, strict lockup contracts may compensate for the fact that the equity stakes held by the initial 
(pre-IPO) shareholders are diluted as a consequence of the flotation. As such, strict lockup contracts may 
be substitute mechanisms to signal the commitment of the initial shareholders.  
Hypothesis 2: 
a)  Firms in which the initial shareholders retain a large number of shares immediately after the IPO to 
signal their superior quality use longer lockups and/or lockups involving a larger percentage of locked in 
shares to add credibility to the signal. 
b)  Alternatively, firms whose initial shareholders retain a large number of shares after the IPO have 
shorter lock- in periods and have a lower percentage of their shares locked in. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that insiders can essentially signal the quality of the firm using three 
variables:  underpricing,  the  percentage  of  shares locked-in, and the length of the lockup period. In a 
separating equilibrium, a high-quality issuer will underprice more, lock in for a longer period of time, or 
lock in a larger percentage of the shares outstanding.
5 Although US studies tend to reject the signaling role 
of IPO underpricing (e.g. Garfinkel, 1993; and Michaely and Shaw 1994), some of the European studies 
have found evidence of such as role (e.g. Keloharju (1993) for Finland; and Levis (1995) for the UK). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: 
Underpricing is a substitute signal to the signal sent by the lockup length and the percentage of shares 
locked in. Hence, firms that use more underpricing lock in their shareholders for briefer periods and/or a 
smaller percentage of their shares. 
                                                            
5  Alternatively,  Loughran  and  Ritter  (2002)  argue  that  underpricing  is  related  to  agency  problems  rather  than  to 
signaling. They also show that the degree of underpricing is correlated to stock market movements.  Lockup agreements  6 
Brau et al. (2001) develop a model where insiders of IPO firms use the length of the lockup agreement as 
a  signal  under  asymmetric  information.  Their  model  predicts  that  lockups  will  be  longer  in  low 
transparency firms, when the cost of investing in positive NPV projects is low and the benefits from 
investing in positive NPV projects are high. Brau et al. also discuss the possibility of an alternative signal 
which  is  the  proportion of locked-in insider shares. They argue that only the proportion of informed 
insider  shares that  are locked in  will  act  as  a  signal.  However, they  discard  this  as a signal because 
information on this proportion is not easily available or easily derived from the disclosed information. 
Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that firms signal their superior quality with the lockup length and the 
percentage of shares locked-in. High-quality firms will be able to revise their final offer price upwards just 
before the IPO after the investors have observed the signal in the IPO prospectus.  
Hypothesis 4: 
Higher quality firms that lock in more shares and/or lock in the shares for longer will be able to revise 
their offer price upwards.  
Underwriters may also find that lockup agreements provide price support for the shares offered through 
the IPO.
6 As underwriters have a reputation to protect, they may wish to avoid a drop in the share price of 
a firm they have recently floated. Therefore, underwriters may prevent the initial shareholders from selling 
their existing holdings in order to avoid a sudden increase in the supply of shares. If one assumes that the 
demand  curve  for  shares is downward sloping,  then an  increase  in the supply of shares will cause a 
permanent  fall  in  the  share  price.  Jenkinson  and  Ljunqvist  (2001)  report  that  price  support  by  the 
underwriter is legal in many countries, including France, Germany, the UK and the US.
7 The way US 
lockup agreements are phrased speaks in favor of the price-support argument. Brau et al. (2000) report 
that for US firms the lockup contract disclosed in the IPO prospectus normally starts with a statement that 
a large sale of shares after the IPO could negatively affect the firm’s share price and jeopardise future 
capital increases. Similarly, in Germany, firms have to refer to lockup agreements in their IPO prospectus 
under the Risk Factors section (Risikofaktoren).
8 
Venture capitalists (VCs) are important providers of external finance to new firms. VCs not only provide 
the  necessary capital  but their  presence  also signals quality as they usually monitor the firm and are 
involved  in the decision-making  process (e.g. Barry,  1994;  Jain  and  Kini, 2000). Barry  et al. (1990) 
analyse a sample of VC-backed US companies. They report that VCs hold substantial stakes in these firms 
and provide intensive monitoring. They also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, VCs frequently 
tend to hold their shareholdings a long time after the IPO. Hence, VCs may reduce agency problems as 
well as problems arising from asymmetric information. The presence of a VC would then reduce the 
period  of  the  lockup  and/or  the  proportion  of  shares  locked  in  irrespective  of  the  shareholder. 
Alternatively, given that the market may expect VCs to sell out shortly after the IPO, the other initial 
shareholders may be locked in for longer and/or with a higher percentage of their shares in order to signal 
                                                            
6 This is the commonly cited motive by practitioners for lockup agreements (see e.g. Rödl and Zinser (1999) who 
state this as the only motive (p.59), and Förschle and Helmschrott (2001) who mention this motive as one out of 
three (p.21)). 
7 The motivation of price support may explain why in markets where only voluntary contracts exist, these tend to be 
between the incumbent shareholders and the underwriter [rather than with the new shareholders or the firm itself]  
8 See 4.1.16 of Regelwerk des Neuen Marktes. In principle, this rule implies that firms should explicitly state any 
potentially detrimental effects on their share price However, according to Novak and Gropp (1999) only 49% of their 
sample does so. Lockup agreements  7 
the firm’s quality to the market. A related argument is that, as VCs are repeat-investors in IPO firms, they 
are likely to influence the choice of the underwriter. Hence, underwriters may ‘bribe’ VCs to propose 
them  as underwriters by promising these VCs less stringent lockups (e.g. the legal minimum). These 
arguments yield the following competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: 
a)  Venture  capitalists,  given  their  certification  role  of  firm  quality,  decrease  the  need  for  larger 
proportions of shares to be locked in and for longer lockup periods for all the shareholders. 
b)  Furthermore, venture capitalists themselves are locked in for shorter periods and/or fewer of their 
shares relative to the other shareholders of the firm. 
There is now a vast body of the finance literature on the role of underwriters in IPOs. Carter and Manaster 
(1990) find evidence that there is a rational segmentation in the underwriter market with high-quality 
underwriters backing less risky issues. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that sponsors (underwriters) 
write lockup agreements that buttress their reputation. The shorter the lockup period the more reputation is 
at stake as investors are likely to blame the sponsor in the event of adverse share-price movements or 
unfavorable  information  released  shortly  after  the  issue.  These  arguments  lead  to  two  conflicting 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6: 
a)  More reputable underwriters are associated with higher quality issues so that there is less need for 
longer lockup agreements and/or lockup agreements involving a higher percentage of the shares. 
b)  Alternatively, more reputable underwriters have more reputation capital at stake and are therefore 
more likely to impose lockup agreements with longer periods and/or a higher proportion of shares locked 
in. 
Finally, Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that high-quality underwriters use lockups to extract further fees 
from the issuing company. They report that US lockups often only allow insider equity sales (or even 
SEOs) before the lockup expiry if they are carried out via the lead underwriter. This will then generate 
additional income for the underwriter through market-making (if the underwriter conducts a block trade 
on behalf of the firm) or though the fees from underwriting the SEO. 
Hypothesis 7: 
High-quality underwriters use the lockups to extract further compensation from firms via sales of insider 
equity or SEOs. 
From the discussion of section 2, one can refute hypothesis 7 for France as the regulation of the Nouveau 
Marché does not prohibit the issue of new shares during the compulsory lockup period. However, the 
hypothesis may still be valid for Germany because the firms may be able to conduct an SEO if it is done 
beyond the 6 month compulsory lockup period. Lockup agreements  8 
4.  Data sources and description 
a.  Data sources 
The data on the characteristics of lockup contracts, ownership and control, and age are taken from the IPO 
prospectuses of the firms. We have set up a unique database which includes paper and/or electronic copies 
of the prospectuses of all the firms that went public on the French and German EuroNMs since their 
inception  (1996/97).  The  prospectuses  were  obtained  from  the  firms  themselves,  from  Thomson 
Analytics, and from the French and German stock exchanges. The database contains detailed data on the 
ownership and control of each shareholder immediately before and after the IPO as well as information on 
the lockup contract the shareholder is subject to, if any. Accounting data, share prices and SIC codes were 
obtained from Thomson Analytics. 
Shareholders are classified into five different categories: executives, non-executives, founders, venture 
capitalists, and others. For the German firms, executives are defined as the members of the management 
board  (Vorstand)  whereas  non-executives  are  defined  as  the  members  of  the  supervisory  board 
(Aufsichtsrat). French firms have a choice between either an Anglo-American one-tier board, the conseil 
d’administration, or a two-tier board consisting of a supervisory board, the conseil de surveillance, and 
the management board, the directoire. For French firms adopting the latter we proceed in a similar way as 
we do with the German IPOs. For firms which choose the one-tier board, executives are defined as the 
senior managers (conseil de direction) who sit on the single board, all other members of the conseil 
d’administration are considered to be non-executives. The identity of the founders is mentioned in the IPO 
prospectus.  Venture  capitalists  are  defined  as  shareholders  who  are  members  of  a  national  or  cross-
national venture-capital association. We obtained lists of members of 31 national and cross-national VC 
associations – among them the Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Swiss, UK, US and European VC 
associations – and checked whether each shareholder was part of one or more of these associations. 
b.  Data description 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the characteristics of the firms that have gone public on the 
Neuer  Markt  and  the  Nouveau  Marché  since  they  have  started  operating  on 10 March 1997  and  14 
February 1996, respectively. We only retain domestic firms that had an initial public offering and exclude 
all IPOs by foreign firms as well as transfers from other markets.
9 We also ignore IPOs by banks and 
insurance firms.
10 Until the end of 2000, there were 268 German IPOs and 138 French IPOs. The market 
capitalisation is defined as the number of shares outstanding times the offer price. The price revision is the 
offer price minus the midpoint of the bookbuilding range over the midpoint of the bookbuilding range. 
The ratio of intangible assets over all fixed assets is measured at the end of the year of the IPO or the 
following year if the ratio is not available for the year of the IPO. First-day (first-week) underpricing is 
                                                            
9 We do not exclude firms that conduct their IPO simultaneously on their domestic market and a foreign market (e.g. 
a German firm going public on the Neuer Markt as well as NASDAQ). 
10  Other  firms  that  operate  within  the  finance,  insurance  and  real  estate  industries  (SIC  codes  60-67)  are  still 
included. For example, one of the German IPOs, OnVista AG, has an SIC code of 6282 (investment advice) and 
provides and develops financial databases and analysis tools via the internet. Lockup agreements  9 
defined as the difference between the closing price on the first day (first week) of trading and the offer 
price over the offer price. 
Panel A of table 2 shows that the Neuer Markt IPOs are on average 13 years old compared to 11 years for 
the Nouveau Marché IPOs. The German IPOs are also significantly larger, have more intangibles and are 
significantly more underpriced than the French firms.
11 Panel B of table 2 displays the distribution across 
industries based on the SIC classification. Although, the Z-test for the difference between two proportions 
(Kanji, 1995) is not significant for any of the SIC industry categories, the percentage of French IPOs in 
the  French manufacturing industry is higher than that of German IPOs in the German manufacturing 
industry. In both countries, the vast majority of IPOs is in the services industry.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Ownership and control 
The  proportion  of  firms  with  ownership  by  executives  and  founders  is  virtually  identical  for  both 
countries: executives and founders are among the pre-IPO shareholders in about 95% and 83% of the 
firms. However, there is a major difference for ownership by VCs between the two countries. Panel A of 
table 3 shows the incidence of VC-backing for the two countries. As much as 61% of French firms have at 
least one VC among their shareholders compared to only 47% of the German firms (the difference is 
significant at the 5% level). If VCs provide a certification role, then the higher incidence of VCs in the 
French IPOs may explain why French IPOs are significantly less underpriced than German IPOs. Indeed, 
several studies have found a negative relation between underpricing and VC backing (e.g. Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; and Lin and Smith, 1998). 
Panel B of table 3 reports the ownership by the different categories of shareholders (non-executives,
12 
executives, venture capitalists and founders) immediately before and after the IPO. Ownership (before and 
after the IPO) by any of the 4 categories is higher in France than in Germany. As panel C shows, it is 
significantly higher at the 1% level for non-executives and VCs. However, after the IPO, only French VC 
ownership is still significantly higher than in Germany. Panel D shows that, whereas all other categories 
significantly reduce their ownership in the IPO, only German non-executives significantly increase their 
ownership and control in the IPO.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Similar to ownership, control (before and after the IPO) by any of the 4 categories (not reported in the 
table) is higher in France than in Germany. However, after the IPO, only VC and executive control (but 
not ownership) in the French IPOs is significantly higher than in the German ones. For France, executives 
as well as founders hold significantly more control rights than cash flow rights after the IPO. The reason 
for this is that most French firms have a provision in their articles of association attributing double voting 
                                                            
11 Goergen et al. (2004) also point out that there are substantial differences in the long-term performance between the 
French and German IPOs. 
12 The non-executives may either own the shares themselves or act as a representative of a large shareholder (e.g. 
another company, or a venture capital firm).  Lockup agreements  10 
rights to shareholders who have registered the ownership of their shares with the company and have held 
their shares for a certain number of years (normally 2 years) since the date specified in the provision.
13  
In about three quarters of both German and French firms, at least one of the founders is an executive 
director, while in about a fifth of the firms one or more founders take up a position as a non-executive 
director.
14 While table 3 showed that the percentage of firms with ownership by VCs is higher in France, 
VCs owning equity in French firms assume significantly more often the functions of non-executive and 
executive director than VCs in German firms. This suggests that the VCs in France are not only more 
important  in  terms  of  providers  of  finance,  but  that  they  are  also  more  actively  involved  in  the 
management and/or monitoring of the management.   
Frequency of lockup contracts 
Table 4 reports the frequencies of different types of lockup contracts for all the shareholders. As most 
firms have more than one contract in place, the number of contracts is higher than that of the firms in the 
sample. Often, the different types of shareholders of a firm are subject to different contracts.
15 Panel A 
contains the types of agreements which lock in 100% of the shares owned by a shareholder (e.g. 100% of 
the shares for 6 months). Panel B is on all the contracts that lock in only part of the shares owned by a 
given shareholder (e.g. 80% of the shares for 12 months). Panel C reports the frequency of so-called 
staggered agreements: a first period during which sales are completely prohibited
16 is followed by at least 
one additional period during which only part of the shares are locked in. For instance, all the directors’ 
shares are locked in during the first year after the IPO, followed by 50% of the shares during the second 
year after the IPO. Panel D covers all other types of contracts. Although, the German regulation requires 
all the pre-IPO shareholders to be locked in, smaller shareholders may be exempted at the discretion of the 
stock market. Typically, their holdings tend to be significantly smaller than one percentage of the equity 
outstanding. Also, German investors who obtain their shares in the preferential allocation of the IPO (the 
so called Friends & Family programme) are normally exempted from the compulsory lockup
17,18. There 
are, however, a few firms which voluntarily lock in any shares from the preferential allocation. Similarly, 
for France, although the stock market rules prescribe that all directors should be locked in, directors with 
small holdings (typically amounting to a fraction of a percentage) are frequently exempt. 
The frequency of certain types of contracts is obviously influenced by the regulation in force in each 
country. Panel B of table 4 reflects that, until 1 December 1998, 80% of the shares of directors of French 
                                                            
13 Such provisions often come into effect retroactively. For example, the provision for double voting rights may be 
put in place just before the IPO, e.g. 1 July 2003, and give double votes to shares registered with the company and 
held  by  the  same  shareholder  for  at  least  2  years  since  1  July  2001.  Consequently,  although  some  of  these 
shareholders reduce their ownership in the IPO, their control may increase (relatively) after the IPO.  
14 A table with the percentage of founders and VCs being directors is available upon request.  
15 This is similar to Espenlaub et al. (2001, 2003) who find that UK IPOs tend to have more than one contract in 
place, whereas one single contract applying to all the shareholders is common in US firms. 
16 We did not come across any staggered agreements with the first lockup period covering only part rather than the 
entirety of the shares. 
17  Novak  and  Gropp  (2000)  argue  that  in  certain  cases  Deutsche  Börse  AG  can  give  an  exemption  form  the 
compulsory lockup rule. They discuss the case of Senator Film AG which was successful in obtaining an exemption 
for its minority shareholders who held 12% of the equity. Finally, the shares that are subject to the Greenshoe option 
– these shares can be new shares issued by the firm or shares sold by the old shareholders – are not subject to the 
lockup agreement. 
18 This is similar to what Field and Hanka (2001) observe for the US. Lockup agreements  11 
IPO firms had to be locked in for 3 years. Interestingly, panel B shows that some of the French firms that 
went public after 1 December 1998 chose lockup lengths exceeding those of the two legal options of 6 
months for 100% of the shares or one year for 80% of the shares. However, none of these firms chose a 
lockup length exceeding 36 months Contrary to the UK, the lockup arrangements of French and German 
IPOs all specify absolute dates. An absolute expiry date is a specific calendar date such as 01 July 2000 
whereas a relative expiry date is e.g. the date of the publication of the annual report for 2000. 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports that the majority of contracts in both France and Germany have longer durations and/or 
larger proportions of shares locked in than those required by the stock exchanges. In Germany, only about 
43% of the contracts follow the legal requirement of a 100-percent lockup for 6 months. Almost half of all 
the contracts specify a longer lockup period of 12 months or more
19. For France, about 16% of lockup 
contracts follow the legal minimum of 6 months with 100% of the shares locked in and about 19% of the 
contracts follow the other legal minimum of 1 year with 80% of the shares locked in. About 13% of the 
French IPOs opt for a more stringent lockup arrangement covering 100% of the shares for 1 year. If one 
ignores all the firms that went public before 1 December 1998 and were subject to a three-year lockup 
covering 80% of their shares, then the previous percentages become 22, 26, and 17%, respectively. 
In the light of the increasing trend towards standardised lockups in the US, the diversity in terms of the 
characteristics of lockup agreements in both France and Germany is surprising. For example, Brau et al. 
(2000) find that 70% of the lockup contracts of their US sample firms have durations of exactly 180 days, 
which is confirmed by Bradley et al. (2001), Field and Hanka (2001) and Mohan and Chen (2001). In 
addition, Field and Hanka (2001) report that for a sample of 1,948 US IPOs with lockup arrangements, 
managers, the selling shareholders in the IPO as well as shareholders owning in excess of 5% of the equity 
are almost always locked in. Given the high homogeneity of lockup agreements in the US, one could 
argue that US firms do not use the length of the lockup and the proportion of shares locked in as a signal 
of  their  value.  Further,  Brau  et  al.  (2000)  doubt  that  lockup  contracts  are  effective  in  mitigating 
asymmetries of information between insiders and outsiders given their short length. They argue that the 
average lockup duration of 180 days will at most cover two quarterly earnings announcements.
20 The 
French and German lockup contracts, given their diversity and longer length, may therefore have a higher 
potential for signaling. 
The lockup period for venture capitalists is relatively short.
21 In Germany, about two thirds of the VC 
lockup agreements adhere to the minimum legal period of 6 months, which confirms the pattern shown by 
Novak and Gropp (2000). In France, the situation is similar. The majority of VCs opt for short lockup 
contracts or at not locked in at all. More than a third of the VCs are not locked in at all and about 40% 
follow the legal minima of six months with 100% or 12 months for 80%. In both countries, most of the 
executive  and  non-executive  directors  are  frequently  locked  in  for  longer  periods  than  the  legal 
                                                            
19 We found that for Germany there were 98 cases where there was no lockup; this figure was 101 for France. 
Almost all of the French and German lockup exemptions apply to shareholders who have acquired their shares in a 
preferential allocation programme (a so-called Friends & Family programme). 
20 Field and Hanka (2001, p.474) report that 11% of US IPOs have staggered lockup agreements. 
21 Detailed tables on the lockup agreements of VCs are available upon request.  Lockup agreements  12 
minimum.
22 The percentage of contracts in Germany with a length of more than 6 months amounts to 
54%. In France, where the stock exchange provides a choice between 6 months covering 100% of the 
shares and 12 months covering 80% of the shares, more firms subject their directors to the latter option. 
This suggests that the longer duration of 12 months is perceived to be a stronger signal than the higher 
proportion of shares with the 6-month period. In both countries, executives tend to be subject to longer 
lockups  than  non-executives.  As  about  three  quarters  of  French  and  German  executives  are  also  the 
founders of the firm, this explains why the contract structures for founders are very similar to those for 
executives. 
Percentage of shares locked in 
Table 5 reports the maximum percentage of shares locked-in for each category of shareholders. In the case 
of a staggered lockup agreement we report the percentage of shares locked in during the first lockup 
period which is always the highest.
23 Panel A shows the numbers of shares locked in as a percentage of 
shares outstanding. Given that by regulation, 100% of the shares of the German pre-IPO shareholders 
have to be locked in, the shares locked in as a percentage of the shares outstanding are significantly higher 
in Germany than in France (see the t-test in Panel B). Panel C shows the number of shares locked in for 
each category of shareholders divided by the number of shares they own immediately after the IPO. For 
Germany,  the  percentage  is  always  100%.  However,  the  French  firms  have  some  choice  as  to  the 
percentage  of  shares  locked in. Bearing in  mind the observations  from  tables 5-7, we  find  that non-
executives and venture capitalists are locked in for a higher proportion of their shares but for a shorter 
period whereas the exact opposite is true for executives and founders.
24 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
Lockup period 
Table 6 shows the minimum lockup periods (in months) for the different categories of shareholders. For 
staggered agreements, the first period during which all sales are prohibited is reported. Although, both the 
French and German regulators offer a minimum lockup period of 6 months, which is close to the standard 
voluntary lockup period of US IPOs, the average French or German firm opts for a longer lockup of about 
10 months. However, this average is still much lower than the average lockup period of about 19 months 
for the UK firms, reported by Espenlaub et al. (2001). We find that for all pre-IPO shareholders the 
average lockup period in France as compared to Germany is (insignificantly) longer by about one month. 
In both countries, VCs are on average locked in for significantly shorter periods than all the pre-IPO 
shareholders  whereas  executives  and  founders  are  locked  in  for  longer  periods.  However,  there  are 
significant differences in terms of the lockup duration between the different categories of shareholders. 
                                                            
22 Detailed tables on the lockup agreements of executive and non-executive directors are available upon request. 
23 Given the relatively small number of staggered contracts in both countries (32 out of 477 contracts for Germany 
and 13 out of 297 contracts for France), the percentages locked-in do not change substantially if the simple average 
percentage of shares locked in for each contract or the weighted average percentage are considered. 
24 When the French IPOs that occurred before 1 December 1998 are excluded, the percentages in panels A and C of 
table 6 only change slightly. Although, ownership by pre-IPO shareholders in Germany is still significantly higher at 
the 1% level, the difference in ownership by non-executives is no longer significant and the difference in ownership 
by the founders is now significant at the 5% level. Lockup agreements  13 
Non-executives  and  venture  capitalists  of  German  firms  are  locked  in  significantly  longer  than  their 
French counterparts (Panels A and B). The opposite is true for executives and founders.
25  
 [Insert table 6 about here] 
To summarise: first, there is a higher occurrence of VC financing on the Nouveau Marché than on the 
Neuer Markt, whereas ownership by executives and founders is similar in the two countries. Second, 
ownership  and  control  of  the  French  firms  is  more  concentrated  both  before  and after  the IPO.  The 
executives and founders of French firms keep a high level of control by using provisions in the company 
articles of association which confer double voting rights to long-term shareholders. Third, French VCs are 
more likely to have board representation (via executive and non-executive directors) than their German 
counterparts. Hence, if there is VC certification, it is likely to play a more important role in France than in 
Germany, given the higher involvement of VCs in French firms. Fourth, French executives and founders 
tend to tie themselves in for longer periods, but with lower fractions of their shares. The converse is true 
for French non-executives and venture capitalists. Fifth, in both countries most VCs are locked in for the 
regulatory  minimum lockup  length. A third  of the French VCs are not locked in. Sixth, the pre-IPO 
shareholders of German firms are locked in for significantly longer periods than their French counterparts. 
Finally,  as  a  consequence  of  differences  in  regulation,  German  shareholders  can  only  signal  via  the 
duration of their lockup agreements, whereas French shareholders can also use the percentage of shares 
locked in as a signal. 
5.  The reasons behind the differences in the characteristics of lockup agreements  
a.  Methodology 
The aim of this section is to explain the differences in the length and the percentage of shares locked in 
across firms and between France and Germany. Given that there is no cross-sectional variation in the 
French sample before 1 December 1998 in terms of lockup agreements, firms that went public before that 
date are excluded from all the regressions. To the opposite of previous studies, our data are at the level of 
individual shareholders. Hence, given that most firms have more than one lockup agreement in place, each 
applying to different types of shareholders, our paper benefits from much richer data. 
We run two types of regressions. The first (table 8) explains the minimum lockup period while the second 
(left hand side of table 9) explains the maximum percentage of shares locked in. The percentage of shares 
locked in is the ratio of the number of shares locked in for a given shareholder over the number of shares 
owned by that shareholder immediately after the IPO. If a shareholder is subject to a staggered lockup 
agreement we consider the percentage which applies during the first period of the agreement and which 
always happens to be 100%. As there is no variation in this ratio for Germany (by law the ratio is equal to 
100%), this model is only estimated for the French sample. We do not only run OLS regressions, but also 
multinomial logits (results reported in table 9) for the following reasons. First, there is a high discreteness 
of the percentage of shares locked and the length of the lockup period. For example, very few contracts 
specify percentages other than 0, 80 or 100%. Second, and more importantly, the French regulator has 
                                                            
25 If French IPOs before the regulatory change of 1 December 1998 are excluded (not reported) then German non-
executives and VCs are still locked in for substantially longer periods, but there is no longer a difference between the Lockup agreements  14 
created  interdependence  between  the  percentage  of  shares  locked  in  and  the  length  of  the  lockup. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the two variables jointly by running a logit which distinguishes 
between  different  combinations  of  the  lockup  length  and  the  percentage  of  shares  locked  in.  The 
dependent variable of the multinomial logit is equal to zero if the shareholder is not locked in; equal to 1 if 
80% of his shares are locked in for one year, 2 if all of his shares are locked in for 6 months, and 3 if all of 
his shares are locked in for more than 6 months. The 45 shareholders subject to other lockup arrangements 
are  excluded  from  the  multinomial  logit  regressions.  All  models  contain  time  dummies  and  industry 
dummies (based on the SIC codes obtained from Thomson Analytics, see table 2).
26  
To test the effect of uncertainty on lock in contracts (hypothesis 1) we use three different proxies for 
uncertainty: the ratio of intangible assets over total assets, the age of the firm and the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalisation calculated at the offer price (in ￿ million). We expect a negative coefficient on 
the last two variables and a positive one on the first one.
27  
In order to  check the validity of hypothesis 2 (the impact of ownership concentration), we use three 
variables: the free-float, the Herfindahl index of post-IPO ownership by the pre-IPO shareholders, and 
ownership by the individual shareholder. The free-float measures how many primary and secondary shares 
have been sold in the IPO and gives us an idea of the dispersion of overall ownership of the firm after the 
IPO. The Herfindahl index measures the concentration of post-IPO ownership by the initial shareholders.
28 
The third variable captures the share stake of the specific shareholder. This variable allows us to perform a 
slightly different test on the validity of hypothesis 2 by checking whether different shareholders of a firm 
are treated differently while controlling for the size of their post-IPO holdings. A negative coefficient on 
the  free-float  would  support  hypothesis  2a  (stricter  lockups  give  credibility  to  the  signal)  whereas  a 
positive coefficient would lend support to the competing hypothesis 2b (ownership concentration and 
strict lockups are substitutes). For the Herfindahl index and the ownership of the individual shareholder 
we expect a positive sign if hypothesis 2a is valid and a negative sign if the competing hypothesis 2b is 
valid. 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
Underpricing is measured in two ways, i.e. on the first day of trading and also after the first week of 
trading.  If  hypothesis  3  is  correct  and  underpricing  is  a  substitute  signal,  then  the  coefficient  on 
underpricing will be negative. The price revision is defined, in line with Brav and Gompers (2003), as the 
ratio  of  the  difference  between  the  offer  price  and  the  midpoint  of  the  bookbuilding  range  over  the 
midpoint of the bookbuilding range. If hypothesis 4 is valid, the coefficient on the price revision will be 
positive.  
Hypothesis 5 consists of a set of competing hypotheses. Hypothesis 5a assumes that VCs are a substitute 
device to lockups whereas hypothesis 5b assumes that VCs act as complements. In order to check the 
validity of hypothesis 5, we use two different variables. First, we use a dummy variable which is set to one 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
executives and founders of the two countries. Also, overall, German pre-IPO shareholders are now locked in for 
significantly longer periods than their French counterparts. 
26 The industry dummies and time dummies are jointly significant in each regression. 
27 The predicted signs of the independent variables are summarized in table 11. 
28 The Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared ownership stakes of the pre-IPO shareholders and ranges from 0 to 
1.  Lockup agreements  15 
if the firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. Second, we use a dummy variable which equals one if a 
particular shareholder is a VC, and zero otherwise. Thus, the first variable is a firm-specific variable 
whereas the second variable is shareholder specific. Hypothesis 5a predicts a negative coefficient on the 
first variable and has no prediction as to the sign of the second variable. Hypothesis 5b predicts a positive 
sign for the coefficient on the first variable and a negative one for the second variable.  
We  include  three  additional  shareholder-specific  dummy  variables:  the  first  one  equals  one  if  the 
shareholder is a founder, the second equals one if the shareholder is an executive and the third equals one 
if the shareholder is a non-executive. We expect positive coefficients on the first two dummies and a 
negative one on the last one.  
According to hypothesis 6a, good underwriters only take high-quality firms public and therefore there is 
less  need  for  a  longer  lockup  and/or  a  higher  percentage  of  shares  to  be  locked  in.  The  competing 
hypothesis 6b states that reputable underwriters will lock in firms for longer and/or for a higher proportion 
of their shares as they have more reputation capital to protect. For Germany, we use Franzke’s (2003) 
measure of underwriters’ reputation. For the IPOs in 1997, the measure of reputation for each underwriter 
is the percentage of IPOs on all the segments of the Frankfurt stock exchange from 1990 to 1996 for 
which it acted as lead underwriters. For the years 1998 to 2000, the measure of reputation also includes 
the percentage of IPOs for which the underwriter acted as the lead underwriter on the Neuer Markt from 
1997 until the end of the year preceding the IPO. Equal weighting is applied to the two percentages. In 
order to compute the reputational measure, all the segments of the stock exchange need to be considered, 
as some highly reputable underwriters, i.e. those with a substantial share of IPOs on the main segments, 
may  have  refrained  from  taking  public  the  lesser-quality  IPOs  on  the  Neuer  Markt.  Hence,  by  just 
considering an underwriter’s market share on the Neuer Markt, one would underestimate their reputation. 
An equivalent measure of underwriters’ reputation for France is not available. 
Hypothesis 7, which states that underwriters may use lockups to extract further fees from the firms via 
SEOs conducted during the lockup period, is refuted for France; as French lockup agreements do not 
contain restrictions about the issue of new shares. For the German IPOs, we investigated how many firms 
had SEOs before the expiry of their lockup agreement.
29 We find that firms wait until the expiry of their 
lockup to issue further shares. Similarly, for the US, Brav and Gompers (2003) report that the likelihood 
of having the SEO with the IPO underwriter is not affected by the fact whether the SEO is within the 
lockup period or not. 
Table  7  summarises  the  hypotheses,  the  variables,  and  the  predicted  signs  of  their  coefficients.  The 
correlation  matrix  of  all  the  independent  variables  reveals  that,  for  both  countries,  there  is  a  high 
correlation between the free-float after the IPO and the dummy variable indicating whether the firm is 
VC-backed. There could be two reasons. First, VCs use the IPO as a partial exit route; sell off a significant 
proportion of their holding in the IPO while keeping a stake in the firm. Second, VC-backed firms are 
relatively more risky and, therefore, the diversification benefits for all the shareholders are higher. Hence, 
all the shareholders of VC-backed firms will sell relatively more shares in the IPO than those of firms 
without VC-backing. We find that both reasons hold. Analysing the German data, we find that VCs sell on 
average 26% of their shares in the IPO compared to 9% of shares for the other shareholders of the VC-
                                                            
29 If a firm has more than one lockup contract in place, we use the first date of expiry. Lockup agreements  16 
backed firms. The difference in means is significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. On average, 
any  of  the  shareholders  (i.e.  VCs  and  non-VCs)  of  VC-backed  firms  sell  about  11%  of  their  shares 
through the IPO compared to only 8% for the shareholders of firms without VC-backing. The difference 
in means is statistically significant at the 5% level for the two-tailed test. For France, VCs sell 13% of 
their shares in the IPO compared to 8% for the other shareholders of VC-financed firms. However, the 
difference is not significantly different from zero. The shareholders of VC-backed firms sell 9% of their 
shares compared to 5% for the shareholders of firms that are not financed by VCs. The difference is 
significant at the 1% level.  
b.  Regression results 
The  models  in  table  8  on  the  length  of  the  lockup  period  for  both  France  and  Germany  have  high 
explanatory power (15-20%). There is strong support for hypothesis 1 for both France and Germany: less 
uncertainty about the firm’s future value – as measured by the firm’s age and its market capitalisation at 
the offer price – decreases the length of the lockup agreement. Furthermore, the coefficient on the ratio of 
intangibles over fixed assets is positive and significant at better than the 0.1% level for Germany. 
There is no evidence for the validity of either of the competing hypotheses 2a and 2b for the German IPOs 
as  the  coefficients  on  the  free-float  and  on  the  percentage  of  shares  locked  in  for  the  individual 
shareholder are not significantly different from zero. However, for France both coefficients are highly 
significant (at the 0.1% level or better) and positive. The multinomial logit regression in table 9 takes the 
interdependence between the lockup period and the percentage of shares locked in into account and tests 
the validity of these hypotheses further.  
As the coefficient on first-day underpricing is highly significant in all the regressions, hypothesis 3 is 
upheld for Germany.
30 This suggests that, on the Neuer Markt, underpricing acts as a substitute signal to 
the lockup length. The reason why the hypothesis is not supported by the French data may be due to the 
fact that underpricing in France is significantly less substantial with an average of 21.2% for first-day 
underpricing compared to 58.5% for Germany (see table 2).  
No support is found for hypothesis 4 which states that firms that use longer lockup periods as a signal of 
their superior quality are able to revise their offer price when the signal has been perceived by the market. 
Similarly, Brav and Gompers (2003) do not find any support for this signaling hypothesis. They report 
that  firms  that  revise  the  final  issue  price  upwards  have  shorter  lockups,  but  the  difference  is  not 
statistically different from zero.
31  
Hypothesis 5 is on the role of VCs, i.e. whether they provide a certification role that acts as a substitute to 
lockups (hypothesis 5a) or whether they are a complement to lockups (hypothesis 5b). For Germany, we 
find that the coefficient on the dummy variable which indicates whether the shareholder is a VC is highly 
significant and negative. However, the coefficient on the dummy variable which indicates whether the 
shareholder’s firm is VC-backed is insignificant. This suggests that, in Germany, VCs are locked in for 
                                                            
30  We  also  used  the  natural  logarithm  of  (1  +  first-day  underpricing)  and  of  (1+  first-week  underpricing).  The 
coefficient was slightly less significant, but still had the correct sign. 
31 The fact that we do not find a significant impact of the price revision on the lockup characteristics could be due to 
the nature of the market which is a bull market. As table 2 shows, almost all of the firms had a positive price 
revision. The price revision would then reflect rapidly increasing market prices rather than the firm’s quality. Lockup agreements  17 
shorter periods, but VC-backing has neither a significantly positive nor negative impact on the length of 
the  lockup  applying  to  the  other  shareholders  of  the  firm.  Hence,  in  Germany,  VCs  are  neither 
complements nor supplements to the lockup length. For France, the coefficient indicating whether the 
shareholder is a VC is negative and highly significant. However, in contrast to Germany, the coefficient 
indicating whether the firm is VC-backed is significantly positive. This suggests that hypothesis 5b is 
valid for France: VCs are locked in for shorter periods, but at the same time, the other shareholders of the 
firm are locked in for longer. Hence, VCs seem to act as complementary signaling devices to lockups by 
increasing the length of the lockup period for all the other shareholders. However, this result should be 
interpreted with caution. First, we still need to bear in mind the interdependence between the lockup 
period and the percentage of shares locked in. Second, model (1) for France shows that the overall effect 
for VC shareholders is positive (2.621–2.268=0.353). This indicates that although a VC is locked in for a 
shorter period (the negative coefficient) than the other shareholders of the firm, he will still be locked in 
somewhat longer (for about a third of a month) than shareholders of non VC-backed firms. Further, in 
model  (3),  the  two  coefficients  cancel  out.  This  suggests  that  when  one  adjusts  for  the  ownership 
distribution across pre-IPO shareholders – which depends on the level of uncertainty about the firm
32 – 
VCs are subject to the minimum lockup period (zero effect) whereas the other shareholders of the firm are 
locked in for longer (positive effect). Espenlaub et al. (2003b) also report that VCs in the UK seem to be 
complements to lockups rather than supplements. They also find that lockup periods are particularly long 
for VC-backed high-tech firms whereas for the other firms the presence of a venture capitalist reduces the 
lockup length. 
Finally, table 8 documents strong support for hypothesis 6b as the coefficient on underwriter’s reputation 
in  regression  (3)  for  Germany  is  positive  and  highly  significant.  This  suggests  that  high-quality 
underwriters impose longer lockups on the shareholders of the firms they take public in order to protect 
their reputational capital. Conversely, Espenlaub et al. (2001) do not find that underwriter reputation has 
an impact on the lockup characteristics of UK IPOs. 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
To summarise, we find that firm as well as shareholder characteristics explain a significant part of the 
cross-sectional variation in the length of lockup arrangements for IPOs on both the Neuer Markt and the 
Nouveau Marché.
33  
Table 9 reports the results for the models explaining the percentage of shares locked-in for the French 
IPOs. The explanatory power is substantially better (ranging from 0.28 to 0.32) than that of the regressions 
explaining the length of the lockup. On the whole, the percentage of shares locked is influenced by the 
same factors as the lockup period: uncertainty, agency conflicts, VC certification and shareholder type. 
However,  there  are  some differences.  We find  a strongly statistically  significant  relation between the 
percentage locked in and the degree of price revision of the offer price. This implies that a high percentage 
of locked-in equity increases the market’s confidence in the quality of the firm such that the firm is able to 
                                                            
32  Theoretical  models  such  as  Bolton  and  von  Thadden  (1998)  predict  that  for  high-risk  firms  the  benefits  of 
ownership diversification outweigh those of monitoring generated by concentrated ownership. 
33 As a robustness check, we re-estimated the models excluding the ratio of intangibles over fixed assets (the results 
are not reported in the table) as we do not have this ratio for about half of the German firms and about 40% of the 
French for the year of the IPO (or the following year). The results are similar to the ones reported above. Lockup agreements  18 
revise  the  offer  price  upwards.  The  coefficients  on  firm  size  (the  natural  logarithm  of  the  market 
capitalisation at the offer price) and the ratio of intangibles over fixed assets have opposite signs to the 
predicted ones as a consequence of contract choice (see the multinomial logit model below, table 10).  
[Insert table 9 about here] 
Given the interdependence between the length of the lockup and the percentage of shares locked in for the 
case of France, we run an additional multinomial logit regression. The logit distinguishes between four 
types of lockup contracts: no lockup (Y=0), an 80-percent share lockup for 1 year (Y=1), a 100-percent 
share  lockup  for  6  months  (Y=2),  and  a  100-percent  share  lockup  for  more  than  6  months  (Y=3). 
Shareholders subject to all other types of contracts are excluded from the regression. The results (based on 
shareholder rather than firm data) are reported in table 9. The firm’s size, as measured by the natural 
logarithm of its market capitalisation at the offer price, has a significant influence on the odds of each of 
the three latter cases (relative to the base case of no lockup). Larger firms are more likely to lock in all of 
the shares of their shareholders for 6 months whereas the smaller firms are more likely to opt for longer 
lockup periods (either 1 year with 80% of the shares locked in or lockup durations of more than 6 months 
with all the shares locked-in). Adjusting for the interdependence between the choice of the percentage of 
shares locked in and the period of the lockup created by the French regulator, we find strong support for 
hypothesis 1. The same conclusion applies to the other proxies for uncertainty, i.e. the age of the firm and 
the ratio of intangibles over fixed assets. This provides support to an earlier conclusion drawn from the 
descriptive tables that firms do not perceive the two contracts to be equivalent. Firms regard the legal 
option of 80% for one year to be a stronger commitment than the legal option of 100% for six months.
34 
[Insert table 9 about here] 
The coefficient on the shareholder’s ownership is always positive and significantly different from zero. 
First, this suggests that large shareholders are unlikely to be exempt from being locked in, which is a 
trivial  result,  given  the  nature  of  the  regulation.  Second,  firms  with  a  high  level  of  ownership 
concentration in the hands of few shareholders, as measured by the Herfindahl index, are more likely to 
have all the shares locked in for 6 months. Furthermore, large shareholders of highly concentrated firms 
will be subject to a six-month lockup covering all of their shares as the coefficient on the Herfindahl index 
and the coefficient of the shareholder’s ownership are both positive. In more risky firms, as measured by a 
high ratio of intangibles to fixed assets, the minimum contract of 6 months lockup with 100% of the 
shares is less likely to occur. This confirms hypothesis 2b: substantial ownership retention and riskiness 
convincingly signal the quality of the firm to the market and significantly reduces potential agency costs 
such that stricter lockup agreements are not necessary. 
Hypothesis 3 is not confirmed as underpricing does not seem to act as a substitute signal to the lockup 
length and the percentage of shares locked in. For each of the three types of lockup arrangements, the 
coefficient on price revision is always positive and significantly different from zero. This implies support 
                                                            
34 This conclusion applies to all the variables, except for the shareholder’s ownership after the IPO as the odds of 
being locked in for one year with 80% of the shares and those of being locked in for 6 months and 100% of the 
shares are virtually identical. The results reflect the fact that often small shareholders, typically holding a fraction of 
a percentage point of the firm’s equity, are exempt from the lockup. Lockup agreements  19 
for hypothesis 4 as shareholders of firms with a positive price revision are more likely to be locked in than 
to be exempt from a lockup.
35  
When a firm is VC-backed, the likelihood that its shareholders are subject to a lockup contract is high. 
However, VC-backing implies that the most likely lockup agreement is the minimum contract of 6 months 
locking in 100% of the shares and, at the same time, contracts with longer lockup periods are less likely. 
This finding supports the certification role of VCs (hypothesis 5a). We also find that the probability that 
the venture capitalist is locked in with all of her shares and for longer than the official minimum of 6 
months is small (which supports hypothesis 5b).  
We summarize the conclusions on the duration of lockup agreements as follows. First, for both countries, 
uncertainty  about  the  firm’s  future  prospects  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  lockup  period  as 
shareholders of smaller and younger firms are locked in for longer. In Germany, uncertainty proxied by 
the relative size of intangible assets also increases the lockup duration. Second, the lockup period varies 
by type of shareholder as well as by ownership concentration. For both the French and German IPOs, 
venture capitalists have shorter lockup agreements. In contrast, the share stakes retained by executive and 
non-executive directors at the flotation are locked in for longer periods. In French IPOs, strong ownership 
concentration is related to longer lockup agreements, but not when this strong ownership concentration is 
mainly caused by one shareholder. This suggests that the presence of multiple large shareholders leads to 
longer lockups but that one powerful shareholder can reduce the duration of her lockup contract. Third, as 
it is possible that VCs play a certification role, VC backing may reduce the need for long lockups as a 
signal of firm quality. While we find no relation between VC backing and lockup length for German 
firms, there is a positive relation for French firms. This implies that the VC backing is not a substitute 
device to the lockup length but rather complement. Fourth, for the German IPOs (though not for the 
French ones), there is strong evidence that underpricing acts as a substitute signal of firm quality to the 
lockup length. In contrast, the underwriter’s reputation is related to longer lockups. Finally, we find a 
weak negative relation between price revisions of the offer price and the lockup duration of German IPOs. 
This refutes the hypothesis that long lockups signal quality and thereby allow positive revisions of the 
offer price.  
In contrast to Germany, French regulation allows firms to lock in shareholders for less than 100% of their 
equity stake (albeit for longer time periods). Interestingly, we find that for France, the market is not 
indifferent between the two legal ‘minimum’ lockup agreements (of 100% of the shares for 6 months and 
of 80% of the shares for 1 year). Overall, the former is perceived to be less stringent than the latter, as it is 
chosen by firms with less uncertainty about their value. While we find that strong ownership concentration 
is  related  to  the  imposition  of  lockup  arrangements,  we  discover  a  more  interesting  relation  with 
ownership  dispersion.  When  there  is  little  dispersion  in  ownership concentration, the  firm  opts  for  a 
lockup contract of 6 months covering 100% of the shares. When ownership concentration is high but 
somewhat more dispersed, longer lockup durations are chosen consisting of either the alternative legal 
minimum of a 1 year lockup for 80% of the shares or contracts which are stricter than the legal minima in 
terms of duration and percentage locked-in (100% of the shares for periods longer than 6 months). When a 
                                                            
35 However, the price revision (or the relative size thereof) increases the odds of being locked in for 6 months and 
with 100% of the shares as compared to the other types of contracts. This finding weakens the above support for 
hypothesis 4. 
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firm is VC-backed, the shareholders are unlikely to escape a lockup although the probability that the VCs 
and the founders are subject to lockup contracts that are stricter than the legal minima is small. In addition, 
there is a high probability that executive directors will be locked-in for 1 year and for 80% of their shares. 
In young, small firms with many intangibles, lockup contracts with longer durations are preferred. Finally, 
we do not find any evidence that firms that signal their superior quality by locking in their shareholders 
for longer or with a higher proportion of their shares are able to revise their offer price upwards.  
6. Conclusions 
Whereas virtually all the published literature has focussed on lockup contracts in Anglo-American IPOs, 
this paper contributes to the IPO-literature by analysing these contracts for IPOs on the French Nouveau 
Marché and the German Neuer Markt. The descriptive data reveal that there is substantial heterogeneity in 
lockup contracts within each country and between the two countries. This allows us to study the type of 
shareholders and firms opting for specific lockup agreements. Contrary to the UK and to most US IPOs, 
firms going public on the French and German new markets are subject to compulsory lockups. However, 
about a third of French firms and half of the German firms choose lockup contracts for their shareholders 
that go beyond the regulatory minimum requirements.  
The paper has uncovered some marked differences in terms of the role of venture capitalists in German 
and French IPOs. First, there is a higher proportion of French firms that is VC-backed. Second, VCs in 
French firms are more likely to have board representation (via executive and non-executive directors) than 
their  counterparts  in German firms. Third, French VCs sell a smaller fraction of their holding at the 
flotation. The higher importance of VCs in French IPOs in terms of monitoring (as measured by board 
membership) may be the reason why for France we find that VCs act as a certification device and an 
alternative to the lockup agreements whereas for Germany we do not find such an effect.  
We find that the shareholders of firms characterised by more uncertainty (small, young firms and those 
with many intangible assets) are locked in for longer and for a higher proportion of their shares. Venture 
capitalists in both French and German IPOs prefer a quick exit after the flotation: they have short lockup 
agreements (usually identical to the legal minimum). In contrast, executive and non-executive directors 
who retain shares after the flotation are locked in for longer periods. We have also examined whether the 
presence of a venture capitalist has a negative impact on the lockup duration as it is possible that VCs 
certify firm quality and thus reduce the need for long lockups. We find that this certification role is not 
supported by our analysis. In French IPOs, strong ownership concentration is related to longer lockup 
agreements, but not when this strong ownership concentration is held by a dominant shareholder. This 
suggests that the presence of multiple large shareholders leads to longer lockups but that one powerful 
shareholder can reduce the duration of her lockup contract. Similar to other studies, we do not find any 
evidence that high-quality firms choose more stringent lockup agreements and are thus able to revise their 
offer price upwards or reduce the degree of underpricing. For German firms, we find that a longer lockup 
length may be a substitute to the initial underpricing in terms of a signal of firm quality. In contrast, the 
underwriter’s reputation is related to longer lockups.  
Interestingly, we find is that for France, the market is not indifferent between the two legal ‘minimum’ 
lockup agreements. Overall, the lockup agreement of 6 months covering all of the shares is perceived to 
be less stringent as it is chosen by firms with less uncertainty about their value. We further find that when Lockup agreements  21 
ownership is highly concentred, the firm opts for a contract covering 6 months whereas, when ownership 
concentration is high but more dispersed, firms choose either the legal minimum of a 1-year lockup or a 
contract which is stricter than the legal minima. For VC-backed firms, all the shareholders tend to be 
locked in although the probability that VCs and the founders are subject to lockup contracts stricter than 
the legal minima is small. In young, small firms with a many intangibles, contracts with lockup contracts 
with  longer  durations  are  preferred. Finally,  we  do not  find any evidence that firms that signal their 
superior quality by locking in their shareholders for longer or with a higher proportion of their shares are 
able to revise their offer price upwards. 
The  paper  shows  that  although  the  French  regulator  gives  firms  a  choice  of  two  minimum  lockup 
specifications, firms are clearly not indifferent between the two choices. Also, a majority of French and 
German firms voluntarily choose lockup contracts which are more stringent than the legal requirements. 
To some extent, this advocates against the use of regulation and the move towards the US or UK approach 
of no regulation or (auto-regulation).  
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Table 1: Compulsory lockups on the EuroNM
a and other markets 










LSE  EuroNext (since 
June 2000) 
US market 
  For the directors:
b 
the issuing firm has 
the choice between 
either 80% of the 
holdings for 1 year; 
or 100% of the 
holdings  for 6 
months.
c  
Before 1 December 
1998, directors 
were locked in for 





100% for 6 
months and no 
issue of new 
shares is allowed 





locked in with 
80% of their 
holdings for one 
year. 
Shareholders 





than 2%) in the 
12 months 
preceding the 
application for a 
stock exchange 
listing are also 
locked in with 
80% of their 
shares for one 
year. The stock 
exchange may 





before the 12 
months 
preceding the 
application for a 
listing. 
d 
All founding shareholders, all 
managing shareholders and 
shareholders sitting on the 
supervisory board are locked in 
for a minimum of 360 days and 
for 80% of their shares. 
Before 24 November 2000, all 
shareholders holding at least 5% 
of the shares outstanding were 
locked in depending on the 
firm’s published results. 100% of 
their shares were locked in until 
the firm had reported positive 
operating income and net 
income. Then 50% of their 
shares remained locked in until 
the firm had reported 3 years of 
positive operating income and 
net income within a five-year 
period. If the firm had a record of 
at least three years of positive 
operating income and net income 
during the 5 years preceding the 
IPO, then there was no lockup. 
All managing 
shareholders 
are locked in 
for at least one 
year and for 











subject to certain 
minimum lockup 
periods if they 
had less than 3 








for a EuroNext 
listing will need 
to choose the 
Amsterdam, 
Brussels or Paris 
market as their 
entry to Euronext 
and will then 
have to satisfy 
the listing rules 
of that particular 
market. 
SEC Rule 144 limits the sale of 
restricted securities, i.e. securities 
that have been directly purchased 
in a private placement from the 
issuing firm before the IPO. Such 
sales are not allowed during the 
first year of ownership.
f After this 
year, during any three-month 
period, the sale cannot exceed 1% 
of the shares outstanding and the 
average weekly trading volume 
of the previous 4 weeks.
g  NASD 
rules also prevent venture 
capitalists who have a private 
investment in the issuing firm 
from selling their shares during a 
90-day period and underwriters 
who have received shares as 
compensation are not allowed to 
sell for one year. 
Notes : 
a The lockup rules are contained in Instruction NM3-02 of 1 December 1998 for the Nouveau Marché, section 7.2.9 of Regelwerk Neuer Markt  for the Neuer Markt, Article 2.2.3 of the 
Rules of the Nuovo Mercato Organised and Managed by Borsa Italiana S.P.A. Lockup agreements  24 
b Earlier documents issued by the Nouveau Marché talk about insiders. The meaning of insiders – typically the directors and the founders – was defined and agreed at the time of the filing of the IPO 
prospectus. 
c For firms that have less than 2 years of age, the directors are not allowed to sell or transfer any of their shares for the first 2 years after the admission to the listing. 
d All shareholders in firms which have been exempted by the stock exchange from providing financial accounts for at least one entire year, are locked in for 100% of their shares for the first year and 
at least 80% of their shares for the second year after the first date of trading. In addition, at least 10% of the equity of firms with less than 3 financial years has to be held by venture capital investors 
or by other shareholders actively involved in the firm’s business.  
e See Espenlaub et al. (2001) for details about the regulation before January 2000. 
f Before February 1997, this period was two years. 
g After their sale, these shares become registered shares de facto (see Field and Hanka 2001). Lockup agreements  25 
 
Table 2: Firm characteristics of the IPOs introduced on the Neuer 
Markt and the Nouveau Marché  
Figures shown in Panel A are the average values. The first figure in parentheses is the median value, the 
second  figure  is  the  sample  size  and  the  third  figure  (if  applicable)  is  the  percentage  of  positive 
observations. *, **, and *** stand for the statistical significance of the t-test on difference in means between 
Germany and France at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, of the two-tailed test. For Panel B the 
figures are the numbers of firms for each SIC category. SIC codes were unavailable for 3 of the French 
IPOs. The figures in parentheses are the proportions of firms in each SIC category. The Z-test for the 
equality  between  two proportions (assuming a binomial distribution) was computed for the difference 
between the proportion of German firms and that of French firms in each SIC category. However, none of 
the differences was significantly different from zero at any of the conventional levels of confidence. 
Panel A: Sample characteristics 
  Germany  France  t-test 





Market capitalisation at 






Price revision  4.3% 
(7.1%, 267, 81.3%) 
2.7% 
(5.0%, 138, 72.3%) 
* 





First-day underpricing  58.5% 
(29.0%, 268, 87.7%) 
21.2% 
(3.3%, 135, 77.8%) 
*** 
First-week underpricing  61.5% 
(33.2%, 268, 80.2%) 
25.5% 
(9.8%, 134, 71.6%) 
*** 
Panel B: Industry distribution (SIC codes) 
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Table 3: Percentage of ownership and control held by different shareholder categories 
Figures shown in Panel A are the percentages of firms with VC-backing. The figures in parentheses are the numbers 
of firms. The Z-test in Panel A is a two-tailed Z-test for the equality between two proportions from two samples, 
assuming  a  binomial  distribution.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  two  proportions  are  identical,  Z  is 
approximately distributed as a standard normal deviate (Kanji 1995). Figures reported in Panels B, C and D refer 
to the percentages of ownership held by each category. 
Panel A: Percentage of firms with venture capital backing 
Germany  France  Z-test for difference in proportions 
47.0% (126)  61.0%  (75)  -2.565
** 
Panel B: Percentage of ownership before and after the IPO 
  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
  Germany  France  Germany  France  Germany  France
  Germany  France 
Before IPO  9.5%  30.3%  53.2%  57.8%  11.8%  26.8%  59.9%  60.4% 
After IPO  18.1%  21.9%  39.0%  42.1%  7.1%  18.1%  43.7%  43.9% 
Panel C: t-tests for the difference in ownership means between Germany and France 
  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
Before IPO        -5.400
***  -1.274  -4.751
***  -0.129 
After IPO  -1.334   -1.178  -5.211
***  -0.058 
Panel D: t-tests for the difference in pre- and post IPO ownership means  
  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
Germany       -3.192




France      2.106
**        4.166
***    2.897
***  4.344
*** 
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Table 4: Types of lockup contracts for all the shareholders 
The table reports the frequency of different types of lockup contracts for all the shareholders excluding the free-float which is never locked in. 
As most firms have more than one type of contract in place the total number of contracts per country is higher than the number of firms for that 
country. The frequency is the number of contracts of a given type over the total number of contracts for that country. Panel C reports the 
frequency of so-called staggered agreements which have one period during which all the shares are locked in (e.g. 100% for the first year after 
the IPO), followed by at least one additional period during which only a proportion of the shares are locked in (e.g. 50% for the second year 
after the IPO). The period reported is the first period stated in the agreement. 
GERMANY  FRANCE  Type of lockup contract 
No of 
contracts 
Frequency  No of 
contracts 
Frequency 
Panel A: All the shares are locked 
6 months after date of IPO  163  43.0%  31  15.8% 
7 months after date of IPO  0  0.0%  2  1.0% 
9 months after date of IPO  1  0.2%  7  3.6% 
12 months after date of IPO  145  38.3%  25  12.8% 
13 months after date of IPO  1  0.2%  0  0.0% 
18 months after date of IPO  16  4.2%  1  0.5% 
24 months after date of IPO  9  2.4%  4  2.0% 
30 months after date of IPO  5  1.3%  0  0.0% 
36 months after date of IPO  2  0.5%  1  0.5% 
Panel B: Only part of the shares are locked in 
12 months for less than 50%  0  0.0%  2  1.0% 
12 months for 80%  0  0.0%  38  19.4% 
12 months for more than 80% but less than 100%  0  0.0%  5  2.6% 
18 months for 50%  0  0.0%  1  0.5% 
36 months for 80%  0  0.0%  52  26.5% 
Panel C: Staggered agreements (in addition during a first lockup period during which sales are prohibited, these 
agreements include at least one additional period during which only part of the shares can be sold) 
6 months  17  4.5%  9  4.6% 
9 months  0  0.0%  2  1.0% 
12 months  13  3.4%  2  1.0% 
18 months  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
24 months  2  0.5%  0  0.0% 
Panel D: Other types of contracts 
80% of shares are locked in for 12 months; a 
smaller proportion of the shares are locked in for 
(a) further period(s)  0  0.0%  4  2.0% 
No sales of shares during 6 months below a 
specified price (normally offer price plus 
premium)  0  0.0%  4  2.0% 
Others  5  1.3%  6  3.1% 
Sum of different contracts  379  100.0%  196  100.0% 
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Table 5: Maximum percentage of shares locked in 
Figures reported in Panel A are the sample average of the total number of shares locked in for each category expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of shares outstanding for each firm. For shareholders subject to staggered agreements, the total 
number of shares locked in refers to the first date after which part of the shares are unlocked. Figures shown in Panel B are the two t-
tailed t-tests for the differences in means based on the shares locked in as a percentage of the shares owned by a given category. 
Figures shown in Panel C are the sample average of the total number of shares locked in for each category expressed as a percentage 
of the total number of shares owned by that category for each firm.
 a Information on the executives was not available for one of the French 
firms. 
Panel A: Shares locked in as a percentage of shares outstanding after the IPO 
All pre-IPO shareholders  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
Germany  France  Germany  France  Germany  France
  Germany  France  Germany  France 
68.6%  53.3%  18.0%  23.3%  39.1%  35.6%  15.3%  17.8%  43.7%  38.4% 
Panel B: t-tests for the difference in means between Germany and France 
All pre-IPO shareholders  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
10.134
***  -1.700
*  1.522  -0.859  1.337 
Panel C: Shares locked in as a percentage of shares owned 
All pre-IPO shareholders  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
Germany  France  Germany  France  Germany  France 
a  Germany  France  Germany  France 
100%  85.7%  100.0%  93.0%  100.0%  84.3%  100.0%  95.1%  100.0%  84.9% 
       
 
Table 6: Minimum lockup period  
Figures reported in Panel A are the sample average of the firm averages of the minimum lockup period applying to each shareholder 
or shareholder category. For shareholders subject to staggered agreements, the lockup period will be the period up to the first day on 
which some of the shares stop being locked in. The stars in panels A and C refer to the significance of the t-test on the difference 
between the average minimum lockup period for all pre-IPO shareholders and the average minimum lockup period for that particular 
category of shareholders. Figures shown in Panel B are the two t-tailed t-tests for the differences in means. 
Panel A: Minimum lockup periods (in months) 
All pre-IPO share-holders  Non-executives  Executives  Venture capitalists  Founders 
Germany  France  Germany  France  Germany  France
   Germany  France  Germany  France 








Panel B: t-tests for the difference in means between Germany and France 
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Log (market cap at 
offer price) 








2a  commitment device  –  Not 
significant 
Not 
significant  Free–float after IPO 









ownership after IPO 








Herfindahl index of 
post-IPO ownership 








Price revision  4  firms signal higher quality 
via lockup and thus revise 
offer price upwards 









backed firm  
5b  VCs as a complement  
device 









negative  Shareholder is venture 
capitalist 




6a  underwriters as substitute 
device 
–  Not 
significant 
Not 
applicable  Underwriter’s 
reputation 
6b  underwriters as complement 
device 




Control variables:            
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Table 8: Cross-sectional regressions for the minimum lock–in period  
The dependent variable is the minimum lock–in period (in months) for an individual shareholder and is as defined as in table 7. All 
specifications contain time dummies as well as industry dummies. Figures between parentheses are the p–values of the t–statistics corrected 
for heteroscedasticity. French IPOs before 1 December were excluded from the sample as they are all stuck to the compulsory lock–in 
period of 3 years. 
  Germany  France 
































Herfindahl index of 
post-IPO ownership 





























































































































































































–  –  1.190
*** 
(0.000) 
–  –  – 
Adjusted R















Observations  1169  1169  1169  403  403  403 Lockup agreements  31 
     
Table 9: The determinants of different types of lockup arrangements in France  
The first three regression columns show the estimates of OLS regressions with as dependent variable the maximum number of shares locked expressed as a 
percentage of the number of shares owned by that particular shareholder immediately after the IPO. The dependent variable in the multinomial logit regressions is 
equal to 0 if the shareholder is not locked in, is equal to 1 if 80% of his shares are locked for one year, is equal to 2 if all of his shares are locked in for 6 months, 
and is equal to 3 if all of his shares are locked in for more than 6 months. Shareholders with lockups that do not fall into any of the previous categories have been 
excluded from the sample. All specifications contain time dummies as well as industry dummies. Figures between parentheses are the p–values of the t–statistics 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. French IPOs before 1 Dec. 1998 were excluded from the sample as they all have compulsory minimum lock–in period of 3 years. 
  OLS regressions  Logit model 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  Prob[Y=1]  Prob[Y=2]  Prob[Y=3] 
  % of shares 
locked in 
% of shares 
locked in 
% of shares 
locked in 
80% lockup 
for 1 year 
100% 
lockup for 6 
months 
100% lockup 























–  ---  ---  --- 
Herfindahl index of post-
IPO ownership 




































































































































































































F–test (p–value) for OLS 
regressions / Chi–squared 











2 for OLS 
regressions / % of correct 
predictions for logit model 
0.319  0.304  0.277  82.4% 
Observations  403  403  403  346 
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Appendix 

































IPO  1                         
Shareholder’s 
ownership after 
IPO  -0.01907  1                       
Founder  0.00361  0.34372  1                     
Shareholder is 
non–executive  -0.02837  0.0872  -0.00288  1                   
Shareholder is 
executive  -0.0071  0.35945  0.40753  -0.15002  1                 
Shareholder is 
venture capitalist  0.08889  -0.00752  -0.16566  -0.01457  -0.18798  1               
Venture–capital 
backed firm  0.22355  0.07807  0.01334  0.01824  0.03775  -0.03494  1             
Age at IPO  -0.33513  -0.04216  -0.10947  0.06145  -0.04086  0.04156  -0.01721  1           
Log(market cap at 
offer price)  0.01318  -0.06293  0.00241  -0.02336  -0.04627  -0.00994  -0.17223  0.05015  1         
Price revision  -0.04279  -0.02401  -0.0119  -0.03433  -0.00997  -0.06651  -0.00966  -0.00887  0.09193  1       
Intangibles/fixed 
assets  -0.14618  -0.02888  0.0188  -0.01043  -0.03937  -0.06881  -0.03412  -0.04548  0.20713  0.20528  1     
First-day 
underpricing  0.16229  -0.10991  -0.0789  0.00339  -0.08331  0.33949  -0.12566  0.28362  0.02542  -0.07822  -0.10008  1   
Underwriter’s 
reputation  0.08074  0.02378  -0.00329  0.02581  0.05624  -0.07768  0.19679  0.05476  0.12773  0.13125  -0.04539  -0.12258  1 
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Free–float after IPO  1                         
Shareholder’s 
ownership after IPO  -0.14269  1                       
Founder  -0.18544  0.26108  1                     
Shareholder is non–
executive  0.03869  0.01866  -0.05113  1                   
Shareholder is 
executive  -0.1965  0.40951  0.37345  -0.26542  1                 
Shareholder is venture 
capitalist  -0.00052  -0.02547  -0.22507  0.06501  -0.13973  1               
Venture–capital 
backed firm  0.47299  -0.10732  -0.16949  0.0559  -0.10472  0.12722  1             
Age at IPO  -0.18176  -0.01453  -0.08072  0.08594  0.03061  0.12224  0.1209  1           
Log(market cap at 
offer price)  -0.17757  0.06096  -0.07441  -0.02656  0.04438  0.09106  -0.14851  -0.03185  1         
Price revision  -0.1522  0.01342  0.1802  -0.07946  0.10226  -0.01483  0.03675  0.03902  0.04309  1       
Intangibles/fixed assets  0.1973  0.02342  0.07324  -0.06562  -0.00294  -0.06556  0.01039  -0.18296  0.26252  0.15263  1     
First-day underpricing  0.23118  -0.12527  -0.33097  -0.05354  -0.12646  0.26123  0.31171  0.17791  -0.10924  -0.11478  -0.28212  1   
Herfindahl index of 
post-IPO ownership  -0.46722  0.1894  0.21384  0.09282  0.07853  -0.14925  -0.20533  -0.07911  0.04399  0.20389  -0.05837  -0.46306  1 
 